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This merely formalizes the notion that decision makers try to do the best for themselves in any circumstances that arise.
In the Hi-Lo game, it is obvious that rational players should choose H, and experimental evidence confirms that that is what (almost) everyone does in practice (Gold & Sugden, in press; Mehta et al. 1994) . The HH outcome is in Nash equilibrium, because each player's strategy is a best reply to the coplayer's; and this equilibrium is payoff dominant, in the sense that it yields both players a strictly higher payoff than the LL equilibrium, where strategies are also best replies to each other. Nevertheless, it is strange but true that game theory provides no justification for choosing H (Bacharach 2006, chap. 1; Casajus 2001; Colman 2003a; Cooper et al. 1990; Crawford & Haller 1990; Harsanyi & Selten 1988; Hollis 1998; Janssen 2001) . A player has no reason to choose H in the absence of a reason to expect the coplayer to choose H, but the symmetry of the game means that the coplayer faces the same dilemma, having no reason to choose H without a reason to expect the coplayer to choose it. This generates an infinite regress that spirals endlessly through loops of "I expect my coplayer to expect me to expect . . ." without providing either player with any rational justification for choosing H.
Other-regarding preferences provide no help in solving this problem, notwithstanding Gintis' claim. The usual way of modeling other-regarding preferences, although Gintis does not spell this out, is by transforming the payoffs of any player who is influenced by a coplayer's payoffs, using a weighted linear function of the player's and the coplayer's payoffs. This technique was introduced by Edgeworth (1881 Edgeworth ( /1967 and has been adopted by more recent researchers, such as Rabin (1993) and Van Lange (1999) . It alters the strategic structure of the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma game radically, providing a reason for cooperating where there was none before; but it leaves the Hi-Lo game totally unchanged. For example, suppose that both players attach equal weight to their own and their coplayer's payoffs, then Player I's payoff for joint H choices is transformed from 2 to (2 + 2)/2 = 2, but this is exactly the same as before. The transformed, other-regarding payoff is identical to the untransformed, self-regarding payoff; and the same applies to all other payoffs of the game. This game is unchanged by other-regarding payoff transformation, and other-regarding preferences cannot solve the payoffdominance problem in other games. This is just one illustration of the fact that game theory cannot model all aspects of strategic decision making, even if it is broadened to encompass otherregarding preferences. The payoff-dominance phenomenon, illustrated by the Hi-Lo game, cannot be modeled within the framework of orthodox game theory (Colman 2003a; 2003b) . The only valid solutions, as far as I am aware, involve either abandoning the assumption of individual agency that is fundamental to both decision theory and game theory (Bacharach 1999; 2006; Sugden 1993; 2005) or assuming that players use a form of evidential reasoning that violates orthodox assumptions of rational decision making (Colman & Bacharach 1997; Colman & Stirk 1998) .
It is worth commenting that any evolutionary game-theoretic model that operates by adaptive learning in a nonrational process of mindless trial and error would tend to converge on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in a game such as Hi-Lo, although this cannot explain why human players choose it in a one-shot game. But the version of evolutionary game theory favored by Gintis incorporates a rational actor "BPC" model in which the brain, as a decisionmaking organ, follows the standard principles of rationality. Gintis believes this to be a basic insight that is surprisingly "missing from psychology," and he devotes the whole of section 9 of his target article to defending it against its critics.
I must comment, finally, on Gintis' surprising assertion that the ParsonsShils general theory of action was "the last serious attempt at developing an analytical framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences" (Note 2).
There have been other attempts, of which the theory of operant conditioning (Ferster & Skinner 1957) 
